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INTRODUCTION
service are allocated fairly among customers. These
additional and simultaneous concerns cause rate-setting
to be a multiobjective process, in which utilities learn
by doing. The process can be characterized as a search
for acceptable rates. Unfortunately, acceptable rates do
not represent a clear target. Acceptability is a vaguely
defined notion that varies over time and among
perspectives.

Water for municipal use has been characterized as both
the most valuable and costly type of water services to
provide (Milliman, 1964). The ways in which public
water utilities represent this value and cost in the prices
they charge has been blamed for important economic
misallocations and redistribution of income (e.g., see
Renshaw, 1982, Boland, 1983, Collinge, 1994).1
References to the water pricing problem began to
surface in the literature as early as 1938, when Harold
Hotelling made mention of how to price water in a dry
country. Ever since, the water pricing debate has been
focused on prescribing the most optimal way of
charging for publicly-supplied water, given its large
fixed costs, its institutional status, and more recently, its
environmental importance. Economists have provided
first-best, second-best, and probably even third-best
solutions to the utility pricing problem. However, still
to this day, pricing theory remains generally
incongruent with actual rate setting practices. The
words of Breslaw (1988) adequately sum up the current
state of nature in water utility pricing:

If one may make the assumption that current water
prices and pricing structures in the United States are
indeed acceptable, as implied by their very existence
and the willingness of consumers and regulators to
tolerate them, then one might blame the search for
acceptable rates for the ills that plague the water
industry today. Over time, deliberate underpricing of
water has fostered public health and safety and
economic development, but has led to deferrals of
operations and maintenance expenditures and
deteriorating supply systems (Goldstein, 1986). In
addition, municipal water districts have been shown to
earn a low rate of return relative to the opportunity cost
of capital, which suggests that significant future
subsidies will be required to maintain the system: a
persistent “money-losing” activity (Mercer and Morgan,
1986). These and other factors likely play a significant
role in the recent finding that currently over 80 percent
of public water systems are considered economically
nonviable (Dziegielewski, 1997). Thus, one could
conclude that acceptable rates are in the eye of the
beholder and at the heart of a growing resource
allocation problem.

"Theoretical niceties are fine for academics, but it is
the pragmatic requirements of daily existence that
shapes choice in the real world (p. 376)."
In order to understand this predicament, one must
carefully analyze the context within which water utility
pricing takes place. It is a context that necessarily
involves interactions of water system functions and the
functions of price with the differing objectives and
perspectives of those who demand and supply water.
Water rates and pricing structures embody a mix of both
broad and specific allocative, environmental, and
administrative objectives. Aside from the economic
efficiency criterion, there is little theoretical guidance
on establishing a price for water. Unfortunately, the
economic efficiency criterion is insufficient for rate
makers who must incorporate practical and political
elements into the ratemaking process. Among other
concerns, rate makers usually must consider how new
rates will be perceived by the public, whether the rates
will recover operating costs, and whether the costs of

AVENUES FOR NEW WATER PRICING
RESEARCH
A look through the water pricing literature does not
yield much information on the actual experiences of
public water utilities in undertaking substantial rate
reform. Typically, the literature is inclined to give
diametrically opposed expositions on the best ways to
formulate water rates and rate structures. Marginal cost
pricing is usually touted from an economic efficiency
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perspective, while variants of average cost pricing are
recommended from rate practitioners that are familiar
with the technical and administrative constraints of
utility rate making. Of course, there are numerous other
options for pricing water that attempt to optimize some
specific set of pricing objectives. The literature stops
short of describing the intricacies of the process and
commonly only suggests that in developing rates
utilities must weigh their objectives and strike an
acceptable balance among competing objectives.

THE NEED FOR A MODEL OF THE RATE
MAKING PROCESS

It is evident that the rate setting process is comprised of
multiple criteria (e.g., cost recovery, equity, efficiency)
and numerous tradeoffs (e.g., higher efficiency-less
revenues, higher ease of implementation-decreased
equity). These tradeoffs exist because water rates serve
more than one economic function. Water rates generate
revenues, allocate costs, and provide incentives
(Mitchell and Hanemann, 1994), and as a result serve
allocational, distributional, and institutional objectives
(Boland, 1983). Sometimes alternative rate functions
can be performed in harmony. More often, however, as
Bonbright (1940) pointed out long ago, “the choice of
one desired objective of rate making makes necessary
the almost complete abandonment of the other,” and “at
times, this situation reaches the stage of an almost
perfect dilemma (p. 388).”

To be sure, there is a substantial amount of information
available with regard to the results of the ratemaking
process, namely the range of rates and rate structures
that have been designed and implemented in practice.
What is missing is sufficient information on the process
through which a pricing idea becomes a pricing
alternative and ultimately a pricing policy. As the water
utility industry faces the challenges of the new century,
the water resources research community should make a
concerted effort to gather and synthesize information
about the rate-making process. Such an effort would
address the following questions:
•

•
•

•
•

•

Can the acceptability and costs of alternative rates
be modeled and predicted prior to rate reform?

The fact that there exists a menu of alternative rate
structures strongly suggests that utility ratemaking
practices are not static. Indeed, analyses have shown
that there are visible trends in the choice of rate
structure over time. Public water utilities, once bound
by metering constraints, seem to be dropping flat rate
and decreasing block rate structures in favor of uniform
and conservation-oriented rates (Duke and Montoya,
1993). The speed of this transition has been more
pronounced in the West and Northeast, which appears to
be correlated with scarcity concerns and the need to
replace aging infrastructure, respectively (Duke and
Montoya, 1993; Goldstein, 1986). It is important to
understand that these are industry trends. In other
words, decreasing block rate structures still exist in the
West, just like flat rates still exist in the East. All one
can say at this point is that individual utilities follow
their own distinct paths in evolving their rates. To the
knowledge of the author, not a single study has
attempted to follow the evolution in rate setting
practices from the standpoint of the individual utility.2

What is the process that water utilities follow in
formulating alternative rate structures in actual
practice? In what ways does this rate-making
process vary from utility to utility?
How do utilities perceive the need to reform water
rates? Is it always revenue driven?
How are competing objectives weighted in the ratemaking process? What are the trade-offs among
objectives?
How do utilities recognize and
accommodate the trade-offs?
How do objectives and weights vary over time and
space?
Does the process change with
circumstances?
What are the qualities of an acceptable rate or rate
structure? How do these qualities vary over time
and space? How do these qualities differ from
those of an economically efficient rate structure?
How do water utilities assess the acceptability of
their new rates?
On which metrics can alternative rates and rate
structures be standardized, measured, and
compared?
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Figure 1. Variance in Rate-Setting Paths
Figure 1 illustrates the problem at hand, showing
different paths in water rate structures over time for
three hypothetical utilities. Over the same period of
time, Utility 1 has changed rate structures once, Utility
2 has changed rate structures twice, and Utility X has
changed rate structures three times. The marks along
the top of each rectangle indicate when there has been
an adjustment to some element of the corresponding rate
structure, for example a change in the number, height,
or width, of consumption blocks, that does not classify
as a change in rate structure.
The illustration
exemplifies variance in ratemaking practices, which
needs to be explained to truly understand the ratemaking
process. First, and foremost, what circumstance(s)
triggered the decision to change rate structures?
Secondly, what factors influenced the decision to adopt
the new rate design? And, how long did the utility
attempt to adjust the current rate structure before
yielding to a new design? Third, why do the ratemaking
paths differ? How much of this variance stems from
situational characteristics, and how much is due to
differing rate setting objectives, differing views on the
relative importance of objectives, and the potential for
achieving objectives? Finally, how much of this
variance is due to a differing process for determining
rates? The answers to these questions are critical to
understanding the ratemaking process and whether or
not the “search for acceptable rates” can be improved.

Figure 2 represents a sketch of the potential nature of
the ratemaking process, which might serve as working
null hypothesis for future research.

Initially, one may assume there arises a need to adjust
the price (or the set of prices, price structure) of water.
As indicated in the preceding section, little is known
about what actually triggers rate reform, and how the
cause(s) vary from utility to utility. Regardless, this
perceived need will determine a primary objective of a
rate change.
The primary objective (e.g., water
conservation) is narrowly defined at this stage of the
game, which allows the ratemaker some freedom to
propose ways in which the objective can be achieved.
Initially, then, the problem might take the form of a
maximization problem, optimizing the choice of water
rate policy along a single dimension without constraints.

As the ratemaker seeks input and approval for his
proposal, additional secondary objectives surface.
These secondary objectives represent a broadened
perspective, which takes into account the values and
preferences of others involved in and affected by the
ratemaking process (e.g., the utility manager, utility
accountants, politicians, and customers).
These
stakeholders introduce constraints on the fulfillment of
the primary objective. For example, the new pricing
policy must not only encourage water conservation, but
must also recoup operating costs and be void of crosssubsidy among customers. Thus, secondary objectives
become constraints to the initial problem when one must

SPECULATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE RATESETTING PROCESS
One might postulate about the make-up of the water
ratemaking process in absence of new primary data.
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Figure 2. A Model of the Search for Acceptable Rates
forego (or trade off) the degree of achievement of
secondary objectives to fulfill the primary objective.

own pricing objectives and ideas on how these should
be achieved.
Once an acceptable rate has been
approved, it is administered (typically through the
utility’s billing and public affairs departments).

This stage of the ratemaking process ultimately
produces a pricing proposal that is considered to be
generally acceptable and filtered of undesirable
elements. Depending on the number of stakeholders
and competing objectives, it may take a long time for
the rate to make its way through the acceptability filter.
Furthermore, the acceptability filter will likely produce
a rate proposal that is much different than envisioned at
the beginning of the process.

Over time following implementation of the new rate, the
utility will receive signals and collect and process
information as to the effectiveness of the new rate in
fulfilling the primary and secondary objectives. The
degree of effectiveness will dictate whether and how
soon this process will need to be repeated. Regardless,
it will be necessary to re-examine rates in the future in
response to evolving objectives and circumstances
(Farnkopf, 1996).

Rate approval may represent an extension of the
acceptability filter if the approving authority or
members of this entity were not involved in the earlier
stages. For example, the final approval for a change in
rates may come from a City Council, who can have its
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TOWARD A MULTICRITERIA FRAMEWORK
FOR CHOOSING AMONG RATE OPTIONS
represented by the various labeled vectors that begin at
the origin. The example shown in Figure 3 scores the
fulfillment of various objectives arbitrarily along the
interval [0,1]. As implied above, different rate structures
and specific characteristics of similar rate structures will
produce different scores on the multiple criteria, and
will therefore form differently shaped webs. The goal
of the ratemaking process, then, would be to expand the
frontier of the web along some or all dimensions that are
relevant to the ratemaker, either by “fine-tuning”
existing rates or my revamping the rate structure
altogether.

This speculative model of the water rate setting process,
and particularly the notion of the acceptability filter, has
elements of a multidimensional decisionmaking
problem. Borrowing from statistics, modeling the choice
of rates is akin to fitting a statistical response surface of
the consequences of a water pricing decision or policy.
Figure 3 translates the multidimensional ratemaking
problem onto a two dimensional surface and creates
what can be called a web of acceptability.3 A rate or
rate structure will fulfill to some lesser or greater degree
many simultaneous rate setting objectives, which are
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Figure 3. The Web of Acceptability
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and trade-offs among multiple rate setting objectives.
The water industry and its constituents need a way to
anticipate whether rate reform will result in rates that
are both acceptable and effective in meeting multiple
pricing objectives.

The ratemaker might be expected to assign more or less
importance to the objectives depicted in acceptability
web of Figure 3. If this is the case, and indeed the
literature indicates that it is, then the concept of rate
acceptability can be related through a numeric index or
scale. An acceptability index, would calculate a total
score for each of s pricing alternatives (Rs) as a simple
weighted sum:
q

Rs =

∑

wk ⋅ r sk

This paper has presented important questions for future
water pricing research and has indirectly proposed some
first steps in constructing a generalized planning
framework for rate reform. A model for constructing
acceptable water rates and rate structures, which
embodies multiple pricing objectives and the practical
considerations of the water utility industry, will lower
the total cost of water rate reform and may increase
overall economic efficiency as rate setting objectives
and trade-off’s become more transparent.

(Eq. 1)

k=1

where the scores given to a particular rate setting
criterion (rsk) are standardized on the interval [0,1] for
each of q criteria that are assigned policy weights (w).
The goal of the ratemaker would then be to choose the
rate configuration that would maximize the weighted
score, Rs,4 subject to certain constraints.
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